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Contemporary Employer Interest Representation in the United Kingdom 
 
Leon Gooberman, Marco Hauptmeier, Edmund Heery 
(Cardiff University)  
 
Abstract 
 
Focussing on employers’ organisations in the United Kingdom, this article contributes to the 
literature on employer interest representation by advancing three interrelated arguments, which 
reflect how the methods, structure and interests of employer representation have evolved. First, 
the primary method of collective interest representation has shifted from collective bargaining, 
nowadays only pursued by a minority of employers’ organisations, to political representation, 
now the most frequent form of collective interest representation. Second, the structure of 
employer interest representation has evolved and is fragmented between a small number of 
large, general employers’ organisations, a large majority of sectoral employers’ organisations, 
regional interest representation in the devolved nations, which has become more important, 
and a new type of employer body, the employer forum, which focusses on corporate social 
responsibility. Third, the shift in collective interest representation is complemented by a 
broadening of individual interest representation, with employers’ organisations having 
developed a wide range of services.  
 
Keywords: collective interests, employer, employer associations, employer forums, employer 
interest representation, employers' organisations, employment relations, individual interests, 
lobbying, United Kingdom. 
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Introduction 
 
Employers’ organisations (EOs) in the United Kingdom (UK) were a central actor in 
employment relations and economic governance throughout the post-war era. They negotiated 
collective bargaining agreements with unions that defined wages and working conditions for 
most British workers, participated in macro-economic governance involving the coordination 
of incomes policies with government and unions, and governed tripartite industrial training 
boards that trained millions of workers (Crouch, 1979). The internationalization of the 
economy combined with the Thatcher Governments’ attack on the collective regulation of 
employment relations weakened unions. EOs withdrew from sectoral and multi-employer 
collective bargaining (Sisson, 1987), contributing to a decline of institutionalized employment 
relations in the UK (Purcell, 1995). This process is well-established in the literature, but less is 
known about the effects of these changes on the representation of employer interests in the 
following decades (Barry and Wilkinson, 2011; Brandl and Lehr, 2016; Ibsen, 2016). This 
article addresses this lacuna by analysing contemporary EO interest representation in the UK.  
 
Within employment relations and the sociology of work, the term employers’ association refers 
specifically to employer bodies that conduct collective bargaining (Windmuller and Gladstone, 
1984; Hauptmeier and Vidal, 2014). However, as alluded to above, many employers’ 
associations have stopped conducting collective bargaining and developed new activities and 
services (Behrens, 2004). Some employers’ associations have ceased to exist (for example, the 
London Enclosed Docks Employers Association or the Federation of London Clearing Banks), 
but new types of employer bodies such as employer forums have emerged to represent 
employer interests in the areas of corporate social responsibility (CSR), assisting members in 
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dealing with new challenges and risks within the management of employment relations 
(Bowkett et al., 2017; Demougin et al., 2017). Given this evolution, this article focuses on the 
broad population of EOs with the aim of capturing all collective bodies that represent employer 
interests in the areas of work, employment relations and Human Resource Management 
(HRM).  
 
The analytical lens for examining contemporary EOs is the literature on interest representation, 
including employer interest representation. The analytical concepts of this literature, discussed 
in the next section, inform and structure the analysis of the empirical data, allowing the 
contemporary characteristics of employer representation in the UK to be analysed. Specifically, 
the article interrogates the how, who and what of employer interest representation: how and 
through which methods do EOs represent member interests?; who represents employers and 
what is the structure of representation?; and what types of interest do EOs represent? The 
historical literature on employer interest representation in the UK has provided some answers 
to these questions (Grant and Marsh, 1977; Windmuller and Gladstone, 1984; Armstrong 1984; 
Sisson 1997; Crouch 1979); however, little is known about EO interest representation in the 
UK since the early 1990s.  
 
This article contributes to this literature on employer interest representation by advancing three 
interrelated arguments, reflecting how the methods, structure and types of interests of employer 
representation have evolved. First, the primary method of collective interest representation has 
shifted from collective bargaining, nowadays only pursued by a minority of EOs, to political 
representation, including lobbying, now the most frequent form of collective interest 
representation. This political representation occurs within a pluralist parliamentary process.  
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EOs also take part in joint labour market regulation through government bodies such as the 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS), Health and Safety Executive (HSE), 
Low Pay Commission (LPC) and the Gangmasters Licensing Authority (GLA). However, the 
composition of their governing boards has evolved from a primarily tripartite mode of 
representation to one including a greater number of independent experts. Second, the structure 
of EO interest representation has evolved and is fragmented along a small number of large, 
general EOs, a majority of sectoral EOs and regional interest representation, which has become 
more important in the context of the devolved national parliaments. In addition, a new type of 
employer body, the employer forum, has emerged. Third, the shift in collective interest 
representation from collective bargaining to lobbying is complemented by a broadening of 
individual interest representation with EOs having developed a range of member services, 
which focus on procedural HRM and legal compliance. Thus, more expansive approaches to 
HRM focussing on high performance or employee engagement are mostly absent with the 
exception of the work by employer forums.  
 
Interest representation and employers’ organisation  
 
A well-established theoretical literature on interest representation exists, including employer 
and business interest representation (for an overview of the latter see: Coen et al., 2010), which 
discusses the crucial issues of methods of interest representation, structure of interest 
representation and types of interests.  
 
Broad analytical approaches such as pluralism, voluntarism, corporatism, and Marxism 
emphasise various channels or methods of interest representation. Pluralism describes how 
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interest groups mediate between individuals and society by representing a wide range of 
interests vis-à-vis the state (Dahl 2005). Pluralism assumes that no single interest group 
dominates and competing interest groups co-exist, which balance each other out in different 
policy domains (Grant, 2000). The state is independent from the different interests and acts as 
an arbiter, adjudicating on merit and choosing the best argument (Grant, 1977: 6). Moreover, 
the state also ensures that all interest groups have the same formal rights to take part in the 
political process. The primary method of EO representation is different in the voluntarist 
model, which assumes that the role of the state in regulating the employment relationship is 
minimised, allowing employers and unions to arrange their own affairs through free collective 
bargaining (Heery, 2010a). In the British case, the preference for voluntary employment 
relations was rooted in the unions’ distrust of government and courts, suspected to favour 
employers. In contrast, in corporatist accounts the state formally integrates interest groups into 
the political system (Molina and Rhodes, 2002), assuming a political exchange, with the state 
providing interest groups with policy making authority, while interest groups discipline their 
members to ensure compliance with agreed norms. This frees the state from regulating 
complex, technical or contentious areas of society, such as employment relations, by drawing 
on interest group expertise (Schmitter and Streeck, 1999). A central characteristic of 
corporatism is reliance upon tripartite bodies and social pacts in which state, unions and EOs 
jointly develop and implement policies (Hassel, 2009). However, Marxists argue that the 
influence of capitalists is structural and given ‘regardless of whether capitalists intervene 
directly’ (Block, 1977: 12) as there is an ‘unspoken deference [by the state] to the need of 
business’ (Lindblom, 1977: 179) due to the importance of companies in capitalist societies. 
Thus, business is less in need of collective organisation and representation, while workers have 
no alternative than to organise in unions to counter the structural power of businesses (Paster, 
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2015). This perceived imbalance leads Offe and Wiesenthal (1980) to conclude that there are 
different logics of collective action for businesses and labour. 
 
However, the comparative literature suggests that the structure of representation is not given 
in capitalism and varies across countries (Martin and Swank 2012). The varieties of capitalism 
literature details how centralized EOs play a significant part in the governance of coordinated 
market economies (for example, tripartite training regimes), whereas liberal market economies 
are primarily governed by markets (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The structure of employer 
representation in both types of market economy can be differentiated vertically or horizontally 
(in practice it is often a combination of both principles) (Traxler et al., 2001). In some countries, 
the population of EOs is organised in a centralized fashion with several hierarchical layers and 
a central employers’ confederation sitting at the top of the pyramid (Traxler, 2008). These 
unitary confederations possess the authority to formulate and implement policies or collective 
bargaining outcomes throughout their organisational network. Moreover, as they represent the 
entire employer community, central employers’ confederations are an attractive, one-stop, 
interlocutor for government. In addition, the structure of representation is vertically 
differentiated based on a range of sometimes overlapping organising principles (Windmuller, 
1984), including economic activity (for example, sector or industry), territory (for example, 
local, regional or international), ownership (for example, private versus public) and size (for 
example, small companies) and function. An example of the latter are employer forums, which 
represent employer interests in the areas of CSR as well as equality and diversity (Bowkett et 
al., 2017; Demougin et al., 2017).  
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Beyond structural considerations, the literature differentiates between types of interests. For 
example, Olson (1965) points to the crucial differences in organising individual and collective 
interests. Collective interests are those that benefit the entire population of employers (for 
example, in an economic sector). Individual employers can free-ride and take advantage of EO 
interest representation without being a member and paying membership fees. This collective 
action problem can be overcome by appealing to individual employer interests through 
selective incentives, such as services and functions that benefit individual employers and 
cannot be accessed by non-members (Sheldon et al., 2016). Other authors distinguish between 
quantitative and qualitative interests (Hyman, 1997; Heery, 2010b). EOs’ qualitative interests 
relate to the treatment of workers and their subjective experience of work (Piore and Stafford, 
2006) that employers often link to high-performance work systems (Appelbaum, 2000) or 
employee engagement (Truss et al., 2013); while quantitative interests narrowly focus on 
improving productivity through reducing labour costs. Another distinction is between 
particular economic interests and general capitalist or employer interests (Offe and Wiesenthal, 
1980). The latter refers to interests that are widely shared by capitalists, while the former are 
those conditioned by the requirements of being an employer in a specific context, for example, 
an economic sector or a region.  
 
Previous literature does not address how the interests, structure and methods of UK employer 
representation have developed since the early 1990s. This period meant a changing context for 
EOs, not a transformative change as happened during the Thatcher Governments, but a gradual 
change that put new demands on UK employers. Importantly, the Blair Government joined the 
European Social Charter of the European Union (EU) in 1997, which delivered new legislative 
rights for workers (Smith and Morton, 2006). This period also saw the creation of new elected 
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assemblies in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, but these did not generally possess 
legislative competencies within labour law and employment relations. Overall, governments 
continued to favour individual rights over collective rights. An example of this can be seen in 
the development of new equality and diversity legislation (Özbilgin and Tatli, 2011); although 
the Blair Government created a Low Pay Commission with collective input from unions and 
EOs. Yet there is a lack of research and empirical data on how these trends affected employer 
organisation. In a literature review in this journal, Barry and Wilkinson (2011) searched for 
research on EOs, and found that they are an under-researched topic, particularly when 
compared with unions. For example, their search of five major employment relations journals 
found only three articles over the previous decade addressing EOs, none of which focused 
primarily on the UK. In 2016 we carried out a methodologically identical search, covering the 
period between 2011 and 2015, with similar results. The next section details how we addressed 
this empirical gap, while the following empirical sections analyse the data and distil the results.  
 
Methods and Data 
 
A starting point for establishing the population of EOs is the Certification Office. Established 
by the government in 1975, its responsibilities include publishing a list of EOs active within 
collective bargaining (longitudinal data on non-bargaining EOs does not exist) (Certification 
Office, 2014). However, many EOs are not registered and we sought to identify these 
unregistered EOs using a web-based directory (Trade Association Forum, 2015), searches in 
practitioner journals, newspapers, the internet and qualitative interviews.  
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The evolution of employer bodies beyond collective bargaining prompted us to develop 
sampling criteria. First, we identified organisations that showed evidence of being active in the 
sphere of work, employment relations and HRM, considering a wide range of activities (for 
example, collective bargaining, advice on employment law, arbitration, health and safety 
standards, support for recruitment, training, voluntary labour standard setting and political 
representation targeting issues in these areas). Second, the membership base must be comprised 
predominantly of employers, or of individuals acting as employers. This excluded 
organisations that target individual managers such as the Chartered Institute for Personnel and 
Development (CIPD). Third, employer members must pay membership fees to filter out 
informal networks or organisations entirely dependent on other sources of funding. Fourth, 
EOs needed to have a website, which we regarded as a sign of organisational vitality. This 
criterion helped to weed out inactive EOs only existing on paper. Using these criteria, we 
identified 447 functioning EOs.  
 
A template and access database was then developed to capture the main characteristics and 
functions of each and all EOs containing some 60 questions across organisation, membership 
and activity. We used different data sources, of which EO websites were the most important. 
We also collected membership numbers from Certification Office records and searched the 
parliamentary website (House of Commons, 2016) to identify EOs that had testified before 
Select Committees. For example, data collection on political representation considered 
evidence from the EO websites (including informal lobbying) and the parliamentary website 
(formal lobbying). Table 1 provides an overview of the different types of examined EOs.  
 
Table 1 about here 
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Systematically collecting and analysing information from organisational websites is a form of 
content analysis, which is similar to the analysis of other content (Bryman, 2015). Content 
analysis must consider the authenticity of data as well as the audience for whom it has been 
written. Websites are the ‘public face’ of organisations and have three primary audiences: 
providing information for existing members; attracting new members by showcasing services 
offered and; representing EOs to the public. Given this, it is unlikely that EOs systematically 
present inaccurate information due to the reputational risk not just for EOs but also their 
members.  
 
We triangulated the database findings with interview data to increase the reliability of our 
analysis. We conducted 68 interviews with representatives of EOs and experts that collaborated 
or had working relationships with EOs (for example, from regional and central governments, 
CIPD and unions; Table 1 provides an overview of the interview data). Interviews were semi-
structured and pursued similar themes to those in the template, but also included open-ended 
queries. Interviews sought a more detailed understanding of the different themes, tested the 
accuracy of the database results and generated qualitative data for empirical illustrations. 
Interviewee selection was based on snowball sampling, where initial interviews were randomly 
selected and subsequent interviewees were those suggested in earlier interviews.  
 
Methods of interest representation  
 
The work of EOs demonstrated a variety of means and channels by which they represented the 
interests of their members, including political representation, joint labour market regulation 
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and unilateral labour market regulation. EO interest representation also included a range of 
individual services which, however, are discussed in the section on types of interests below. 
 
Political representation  
 
A large majority of EOs (73 per cent) engaged in political representation, making it the most 
frequent activity (all percentage figures throughout the empirical sections refer to our EO 
database unless stated otherwise). Representation included consultation by parliamentary 
Select Committees, participation in All-Party Parliamentary Groups (APPG) and informal 
lobbying. The importance of political representation for EOs was reflected by the extent to 
which EOs, including the largest and most influential, were based close to the UK’s political 
capitals. In terms of headquarters location, 49 per cent of EOs were in London and the South 
East of England, compared to 2 per cent in Wales, 8 per cent in Scotland and 2 per cent in 
Northern Ireland. Locations in these devolved nations vary, but those in their capital cities were 
the most common. EO interest representation across the four capitals was even more far-
reaching as the most influential EOs had subsidiary offices in the devolved nations.  
 
Interest representation in the House of Commons was the most institutionalised form of 
participation in the political process, with Select Committees depending on expert witnesses. 
Parliament’s website showed that 140 of the EOs in our database made submissions and were 
questioned by Select Committees over the past decade. Examples linked to employment 
include the Association of Colleges’ evidence to the Business Innovation and Skills Committee 
inquiry on Apprenticeships (House of Commons, 2012) and the British Retail Consortiums’ 
evidence to the same committee’s 2016 inquiry on the digital economy (House of Commons, 
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2016). In addition, EOs participated in a similar way in the committees of the parliaments and 
assemblies of the devolved nations.  
 
APPG allow interest groups such as EOs to meet Members of Parliament or the House of Lords 
and to broach topics and shape the political agenda. EOs led the organisation of 25 APPG, 
where they acted as a point of contact or provided secretariat services. Examples included the 
Association of Colleges’ provision of secretariat services for the Further Education and 
Lifelong Learning group and the British Hospitality Association’s (BHA) provision of such 
services for the Visitor Economy group. Overall, APPGs dealt with a vast range of topics, with 
those linked to issues covered by EOs including the chemical industry, retail trade and small 
businesses. APPG meetings tended to be informal; for example, members met over food and/or 
drinks and interest representatives could suggest topics for the parliamentary agenda or changes 
to current legislative initiatives. 
 
However, lobbying also depended on informal communication outside formal channels, which 
one of our interviewees (interview with Chair, EO, 3.6.2015) described as:  
 
[…] trust is obviously important. That you know, over a period that the relationship 
develops that you can on a two-way basis, share confidence. That’s important. But I 
think initially there has to be credibility so that they realise that what I’m saying to them 
is accurate, it’s well-thought-out, it’s reflective of the sector. […] So for example I had 
a phone call from the advisor for one of our Members of Parliament […] and he was 
wanting to get a briefing paper pulled together and he lifted the phone and said, ‘Can 
you give me some information here? What line do you think […] the Member of 
Parliament should take on this particular issue?’ […] Equally that I can lift the phone 
to them and say, ‘Look. To give you a heads-up here so that you’re not caught’, or, 
‘Can you find out information for me?’, or, ‘We have an issue. Can you help?’ It’s that 
sort of relationship that’s important. 
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In terms of where the boundaries for lobbying lay, the representative (interview with Chair, 
EO, 3.6.2015) suggested that:  
 
You have to be terribly careful. There is somewhere a line in the sand. […] It’s one 
thing saying to a Member of Parliament or their advisor, ‘Look. Can we have a bite of 
lunch’, but if over the bite of lunch I’m saying, ‘Look. There’s a brown envelope’, no-
no. So […] I’ve no problem in having lunch with an individual, but I would tend to 
draw the line there and I would not go really any further than that. 
 
The research assessed the effectiveness of EO lobbying by examining four salient employment 
policies in the period from 2013 to 2016. EO representatives identified the holiday back pay 
policy, new workplace pension, living wage and apprenticeship levy as particularly important 
for employers (for example, interview 'The Manufacturers' Organisation' (EEF) representative, 
5.2.2015; interview Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) representative, 3.6.2015). An 
incisive case was the lobbying by EOs over holiday back pay. This related to EU legislation 
and a court ruling that allowed holiday back pay from 1998, potentially involving significant 
costs to employers. EOs campaigned through lobbying, pressing the government to develop 
protective legislation. The government reacted by creating a working group with 
representatives from the largest EOs (while worker interests were not represented). It 
developed suggestions for clarifying European legislation, which the UK Government quickly 
turned into law (interview with FSB representative, 2.3.2015; interview with British Chambers 
of Commerce (BCC) representative, 3.3.2015). However, EOs were less able to influence other 
employment policy issues. In their lobbying efforts, EOs described the workplace pension as a 
‘bureaucratic nightmare’; the living wage as a ‘job killer’ and the apprenticeship levy as an 
‘additional stealth payroll tax’, but the Conservative-led governments pressed ahead regardless. 
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Joint Labour Market Regulation  
 
Free collective bargaining was the cornerstone of voluntarism in the UK. However, only a 
minority of EOs (13 per cent) were involved, whereby 43 EOs were signatories of collective 
bargaining agreements. Of these, 29 drew their members from within the private sector, but the 
number of employees covered by these agreements was often dwarfed by those covered by the 
agreements signed by the 14 public sector EOs. In addition, 16 EOs were involved in an 
advisory role within collective bargaining, most of which were the regional organisations 
representing local government, who fed into decisions taken on collective bargaining by the 
Local Government Association. The varied nature of EO roles in collective employment 
relations reflected how approaches ranged from highly prescriptive in some cases to more of a 
framework approach in others, with EOs retaining a procedural role with most bargaining 
taking place at company levels. 
 
Furthermore, EOs took part in joint regulation through government bodies. The UK has a 
tradition of corporatist or tripartite political arrangements. For example, UK governments 
jointly coordinated income policies and governed industrial training boards with unions and 
EOs in the 1960s and 1970s (Crouch, 1979). However, given the evolution of the UK’s 
approach to economic governance, contemporary EOs’ participation in government bodies 
focussed narrowly on labour market regulation, including dispute resolution (ACAS), health 
and safety (HSE), minimum wage (LWC) and vulnerable worker exploitation (GLA). There 
were some crucial similarities and differences between the governance of these bodies. First, 
not all bodies were strictly tripartite and EO and union participation varied. Interviewees stated 
that the representation of independent experts, such as company executives, academics, 
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consultants or lawyers has increased (Interview with Former EEF Director of Employment, 
4.11.2014; Email correspondence with former ACAS and LWC board member, 4.9.2016). EOs 
were represented on the governing board of these four bodies; however, unions were no longer 
represented on the board of the GLA. Government ministers were responsible for appointing 
board members to the boards and thus decided on the composition of the governing boards. 
Second, HCE, LWC and GLA advised government ministers on policies and regulation, but 
the government had the power to reject or accept proposals. ACAS differed in that it had the 
authority to decide on policies within its remit without requiring approval by government 
ministers.  
 
Unilateral labour market regulation  
 
Finally, employer forums engaged in unilateral, voluntary regulation of the labour market. 
They provided standards in relation to employment practices that members were expected to 
adhere to, with these acting as a form of voluntary regulation. For example, the Business 
Disability Forum’s (BDF) key service offering was its Business Disability Standard, 
incorporating surveys that measured disability management within participating members. 
While performance remained confidential, they were used to assess performance on a 
gold/silver/bronze basis (Interview, BDF representative, 7.7.15). This served to encourage 
organisations to continually review and improve their working practices in relation to disabled 
people, thus constituting voluntary standard setting by employers. 
 
Structure of interest representation  
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The foundation of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) in 1965 from a merger between 
the Federation of British Industries, the British Employers' Confederation and the National 
Association of British Manufacturers was an attempt to centralize employer interest 
representation (Grant and Marsh, 1977). However, a central employer confederation with the 
authority to speak for the entire business community, or to be a single interlocutor in 
negotiations with government, was never fully realized in the UK. Instead our research showed 
that employer interest representation was fragmented between a small number of large general 
EOs, a majority of sectoral EOs and regional employer bodies, the latter included EOs in the 
devolved nations. In addition, a specialized, functional EO, the employer forum, has emerged 
over recent decades.  
 
Data on member numbers were available for 357 organisations (80 per cent). Membership 
ranged from 6 to 195,000, with a median of 170. These organisations had a combined 
membership total of over 750,000. The largest included: the FSB (c.195,000); the CBI 
(c.190,000); the BCC (c.104,000); the National Farmers' Union (c.55,000); the National 
Federation of Retail Newsagents (c.15,500); the Freight Transport Association (c.14,000), and; 
the Ulster Farmers’ Union (c.11,500).  
 
Only 1 per cent of EOs were fully cross-industry, including the three large general EOs: the 
CBI, the FSB and the BCC. The CBI was the most influential EO and its members employed 
some seven million employees, equivalent to about a third of the private sector workforce (CBI, 
2016). The CBI represented many of the largest private sector employers in the UK while the 
FSB represented the interests of small businesses. Compared to the FSB and CBI, the BCC 
was more organisationally decentralized, relying on 52 local and regional accredited chambers. 
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When the UK government consults EOs on general business and employment matters, it tends 
to contact these general EOs in addition to larger sector-based EOs (interview with Chemical 
Industry Association (CIA) representative, 6.2.2015; interview with BHA representative, 
6.2.2015), which together represent a cross-section of the UK economy.  
 
However, the most frequent type of EOs were national-sectoral and industrial EOs (79 per 
cent). Within these, interest representation by industrial type was examined by allocating each 
organisation to a high level standard industrial classification code, based on an identification 
of the industry in which its employer members were most likely to operate. The largest 
proportions of EOs were active in manufacturing (14 per cent), wholesale and retail trades (13 
per cent) and construction (12 per cent) with the overwhelming majority of EOs focusing on 
one industry (Figure 1).  
 
FIGURE 1 about here 
 
Figure 2 compares the proportion of EOs per industry against the proportion of companies per 
industry, highlighting areas of under and over-representation. Economic activities in 
information, communications and professional services were under-represented by private 
sector EOs, despite having become more prominent in the economy in recent decades. 
Conversely, in some sectors employers remain over-represented such as agriculture and 
manufacturing, but these sectors have economically declined.  
 
FIGURE 2 about here 
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However, this analysis does not consider either the totals employed by these members or their 
density, given that comparative data for EOs are not available with, for example, public sector 
EOs (most likely to be found in either education, or public administration and defence) tended 
to have higher density levels as well as larger employee bases than their private sector 
equivalents.  
 
While most EOs (83 per cent) represented members across the UK, 76 EOs (17 per cent) 
focused on regional interest representation, often within devolved nations. Twenty-three EOs 
(5 per cent) existed to serve the interests of Scottish employers. Northern Ireland had 11 (2 per 
cent) that focus exclusively on the interests of Northern Irish employers, while Wales had seven 
home-grown EOs (2 per cent). English regions had 27 organisations, often linked to local 
government, with the balance accounted for by England only, or England and Wales only 
organisations. Developments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland reflect a new focus of 
EOs on the parliaments in the devolved government. New legislation and policies by the 
devolved governments’ impact on employers, which EOs seek to influence and mitigate. An 
example would be the Welsh and Scottish Governments’ continuation of Agricultural Wages 
Boards, tasked with setting the wages of farm workers. The focus on the devolved nations is to 
some extent a departure from a historical trend, which saw employers’ associations (and 
unions) forming at a local labour market level before amalgamating into UK-wide associations 
(McKinlay, 2013). 
 
Finally, we identified 11 functionally specialized employer forums across the UK (3 per cent), 
including the BDF, Business in the Community, Employers for Carers and the Employer Forum 
for Equality and Inclusion (Bowkett et al., 2017; Demougin et al., 2017). While they were few, 
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their influence was reflected in their reach, with the largest covering significant portions of the 
UK workforce; for example, the BDF membership collectively employed 20 per cent of the 
UK workforce (BDF, 2016). Our analysis of forums such as the BDF, Employers for Carers 
and Employers Network for Equality and Inclusion demonstrated that 70 per cent of their 
membership were companies that each employed more than 1,000 people.  
 
Types of interests 
 
The various types of interests that EOs represented can be differentiated between: individual 
and collective; quantitative and qualitative and; particular and general employer interests.  
 
Collective interest representation refers to those EO activities that have an impact on the entire 
EO population (for example, sectoral, regional or national). The most important was lobbying 
and representing EO interests in the political process, with one large manufacturing EO stating 
that: “We’re essentially a lobbying organisation. We won’t lobby for any one company. We’ll 
lobby for a collective interest” (interview with EO representative, 6.2.2015). The previously 
most important form of collective interest representation, collective bargaining, was conducted 
by a minority of EOs. However, such agreements covered the entire EO membership in a 
limited number of cases, with these generally confined to the public sector such as the higher 
education agreements, where the Universities and Colleges Employers’ Association 
represented employers’ interests. Other major agreements have extensive, but not necessarily 
comprehensive coverage, such as those supervised by the Joint Industry Board of the Electrical 
Contracting Industry (Electrical Contractors' Association). Another widespread form of 
collective representation was member codes of conduct, with these used by 232 EOs (52 per 
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cent), often with disciplinary provisions. However, these rarely related to employment, instead 
covering business issues such as customer service. The codes’ focus on product market issues 
meant that such activity tended to treat employment relations as a secondary issue. 
 
In addition, EOs represented individual interests and provided a range of services and functions 
to members. Virtually all EOs provided networking events and seminars on business 
development. Beyond these, the provision of training was common, with 309 organisations (69 
per cent) reporting such activity ranging from the delivery of a small number of technical 
seminars to larger-scale schemes with external accreditation. However, only 107 provided 
management development training.  
 
Another widespread representation of individual interests was providing advice on 
employment law (47 per cent). EOs regularly offered a helpline operated by a commercial 
provider, with subscription income being used to fund ‘free’ access to the service. As an 
example, the FSB offered a legal helpline that provided legal assistance, while its legal 
protection insurance also provided for legal representation in criminal prosecutions, 
employment tribunals and personal injury cases (interview with FSB representatives, 3.6.2015; 
interview with FSB representative, 2.3.1015). Other EOs provided legal advice and 
representation through lawyers employed by the EOs with, for example, the EEF Northern 
Ireland offering:  
 
(…) support when there is any kind of issues within the employment space, whether 
that’s a grievance to an employment tribunal claim and us supporting and advising on 
that claim, to discrimination claims, to anything that can happen in the workplace   
(interview with EEF Northern Ireland representative, 5.2.2015). 
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Finally, 146 EOs (33 per cent) were active within recruitment and selection, generally through 
the provision of a vacancy advertising service.  
 
Although the representation of quantitative interests through collective bargaining was a 
minority pursuit, interview data indicated that EOs represented further quantitative interests. 
For example, the BHA advocated constraining the increase of the minimum wage to the LPC, 
related to the sector’s low average wages and high proportion of wage costs within the turnover 
of individual member businesses (interview with BHA representative, 6.2.2015). Another 
example was the previously discussed EO interest representation on the holiday back pay issue.  
 
Regarding qualitative interests representation, EOs’ individual services demonstrated a narrow 
conception of HRM and employment relations, meaning that few EOs promoted sophisticated 
HRM practices with the aim of improving employee performance and engagement as discussed 
in the high-performance work systems and employee engagement literatures. Instead the 
evidence indicated that EOs and their members were largely concerned with procedural HRM 
and reducing the risks stemming from employment law. However, some EOs did focus on 
qualitative issues, including those with a CSR dimension, the employer forums. They promoted 
labour standards and HRM practices that regularly went beyond the legally required minimum. 
Employer forums sought to convince members of a ‘business case’ arguing that following 
higher standards was in their economic interests as it increased a firm’s reputation with 
consumers in the marketplace and improved the engagement and motivation of its own 
employees. In addition, forums supported members in improving the experience of employee 
groups, for example, disabled workers, employees with caring responsibilities or older 
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employees, recognising that each group can significantly contribute to a company’s 
performance.  
 
Furthermore, EOs represented a range of particular and general employer interests. Sectoral 
EOs had an important focus on particularistic employer interests, which tended to be shaped 
by the characteristics and requirements of the sectors in which EOs were operating. For 
example, the CIA concentrated on fracking, suggesting that this could be developed with 
unions (interview with CIA representative, 6.2.2015). Numerous cases of regional interest 
representation also existed, such as the National Farmers' Union Cymru’s vigorous opposition 
to the Welsh Government’s creation of an Agricultural Wages Board. 
 
Finally, there are also general-capitalist and employer interests that are widely shared within 
the EO community, including workplace pensions, living wage, apprenticeship levy and 
holiday-back pay. EOs had broadly similar positions on these issues. A major concern was that 
policy changes would result in higher labour costs, potentially impacting on members’ 
competitiveness.  Furthermore, the majority of EOs, including the CBI, FSB and EEF, lobbied 
for remaining in the EU before the 2016 referendum, but support was not unanimous. For 
example, the official position of the BCC was to stay neutral during the campaign but the chair 
of the BCC, John Longworth, publicly supported Brexit. He was subsequently driven out of 
office as his views were at odds with some members (Financial Times. 2016).  
 
Conclusion  
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There has been little research on EOs and employer interest representation in the UK since the 
early 1990s (Barry and Wilkinson, 2011). The article addresses this research gap by advancing 
three interrelated arguments on the methods, structure and types of interests of contemporary 
employer representation. First, the primary method of collective interest representation shifted 
from collective bargaining to lobbying and representation in the political process. Beyond 
participation in the pluralist parliamentary process, EOs take part in government bodies that 
narrowly focus on labour market regulation but they lack a broader role in economic 
governance. Second, the structure of employer interest representation remains fragmented 
between a small number of large, influential general EOs and a great majority of national-
sectoral EOs, while regional interest representation has become more important in the context 
of the devolved nations and a new functionally specialized employer body, the employer forum, 
has emerged, focussing on CSR (Bowkett et al., 2015; Demougin et al., 2016). Third, the shift 
in collective representation is complemented by a broadening of individual interest 
representation with EOs providing a range of other services. 
  
By examining contemporary employer interest representation in the UK, this article provides 
insights into how EO interest representation has evolved over time. The literature review 
considered broad analytical perspectives, which allow these changes to be interpreted. 
Voluntarism assumes that EOs and unions independently regulate their affairs with minimal 
government interference (Heery, 2010 a). In the context of waning union power, however, this 
meant that increasing numbers of employers and EOs unilaterally withdrew from collective 
bargaining. Only 13 per cent of EOs continue to play a role in collective bargaining, although 
coverage of the agreements remains higher at 23 per cent of the UK workforce (Van Wanrooy 
et al., 2013). At the same time, the role of government changed, moving beyond the focus on 
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deregulation of markets during the Thatcher governments, focussing to a greater degree on 
individual rights of employees, including equality and diversity legislation (Özbilgin and Tatli, 
2011). In this changing context, EOs broadened their activities and services, but it is striking 
that these primarily focus on legal compliance and procedural issues. There is little evidence 
that EOs promote sophisticated HRM policies with the aim of improving employee 
engagement (Truss et al., 2013) or promote high performance work systems (Appelbaum, 
2000). The exception are employer forums that promote good corporate behaviour, often aimed 
to improve the experience of work as well as the performance of particular groups of worker. 
While this type of private regulation and voluntarism has been growing, the extent to which 
standards are implemented consistently has yet to be examined empirically.  
 
Despite a greater focus on individual rights, government continues to seek EO input in bodies 
that regulate labour markets within dispute resolution, health and safety standards, minimum 
wage and worker exploitation/slavery. This type of policy making can be traced back to 
previous corporatist or tripartite policy making in the UK (Crouch, 1979; Grant and Marsh, 
1977), but the character of the government bodies has changed and a greater number of 
independent experts are appointed to the governing boards of these bodies, thus diminishing 
the influence of EOs. In addition, all board members of these bodies are appointed by 
government and the power to regulate in the cases of LWC, GLA and HSE ultimately rests 
with the government. Unlike in corporatist countries where decision-making authority is 
delegated to tripartite bodies, the UK government bodies only provide recommendations for 
regulation and policy, which the government can reject or accept. This is different in the case 
of ACAS, which can independently set policies and mediate workplace conflicts, making it the 
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only exception with such powers in which EOs participate. Thus, the overall EO influence on 
government bodies has decreased.  
 
The above discussed role of EOs in policy making focusses narrowly on labour market issues. 
Beyond this UK EOs lack a broader role in economic governance or coordination as can be 
observed in coordinated market economies, where, for example, EOs take part in the 
governance of training and apprenticeships systems (Hall and Soskice, 2001). While UK EOs 
once took part in the governance of industrial training boards (Keep and Rainbird, 2003), they 
play no institutionalized role in the current training regime, the Sector Skills Councils, or other 
areas of broader economic governance. Given this, EOs have developed a stronger focus on 
lobbying and influencing legislation. The ‘structural power hypothesis’ suggests that 
governments tend to support employer interests (Block, 1977; Paster, 2015); however, this was 
not confirmed by our examination of the most important employment policy issues for EOs 
from 2013 to 2016. Many policies acted against employer interests such as the new workplace 
pension, living wage and training workplace levy, but EOs successfully lobbied to limit holiday 
back pay. The influence of EOs in coordinated market economies often stems from their 
institutionalized role in policy making or economic governance (Molina and Rhodes, 2002; 
Schmitter and Streeck, 1999). In the absence of such leverage, UK EOs are a pressure group 
acting within a pluralist political process (Grant, 2000). The formal process has undergone few 
changes in Westminster, but the newly introduced parliaments and governments in the 
devolved nations have become a focus for EO lobbying. The devolved parliaments have little 
authority to enact employment legislation, but nonetheless deal with policy issues of relevance 
for employers such as the Agricultural Wages Boards.  
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The article contributes to an understanding of the evolution of employer interest representation 
in the UK. However, there are also limitations to our research as it did not examine members 
of EOs, i.e. individual employers. Such a research focus, either in the form of a member survey 
or interviews with employers, would provide insights into how members assess the 
effectiveness of individual services and EO representation and why employers join EOs. This 
data would allow Olson’s (1965) classic question to be addressed, clarifying how UK EOs have 
overcome the collective action problem and maintained relevance for their members in a 
changing British political economy. 
 
Historically, the primary reason for employers to associate was to counter trade union power, 
labour strikes and rising labour costs. When trade union power waned and collective bargaining 
declined, it was by no means given that employers would continue to organise collectively. 
While some UK EOs ceased to exist, others transformed their organisations and developed new 
activities and services to retain members and attract new ones. They deliver benefits to their 
members and represent employers in the political process, which shows that EOs continue to 
play a role in the governance of UK employment relations.  
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Table 1: Overview of data 
 
 
Figure 1. Foci of UK wide sectoral EOs 
 
Note: Four industries scoring less than 2 per cent not shown; (1) Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning 
supply (2) Water supply, sewerage, waste management (3) Mining and quarrying (4) Real estate activities. 
 
 
 
Focus of interviews Nr. of interviews Noteworthy examples Nr. of EOs
Percent. of 
all EOs
General EOs 6 Confederation of British Industry, Federation of Small 
Businesses, British Chambers of Commerce 6 1%
Sectoral EOs 18
EEF-The Manufacturers' Organisation, Chemical Industries 
Association, National Federation of Retail Newsagents, Local 
Government Association
358 80%
Regional EOs 7 Ulster Farmers‘ Union, Scottish Engineering, Colleges Wales,  Scottish Federation of Housing Associations 72 16%
Employer Forums 18 Business Disability Forum, Business in the Community, 
Employer Network for Equality and Inclusion 11 3%
Experts 19 CIPD, ACAS, Trade Union Congress -- --
Totals 68 447 100%
 37  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Foci of UK wide sectoral EOs compared to proportion of companies per sector. 
 
Note: Public sector, cross-sectoral, sub-UK EOs and employer forums excluded. 
Source: Office for National Statistics. Business population estimates, 2015, authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 2: Abbreviations 
 
ACAS Advisory, Conciliation and Advisory Service
APPG All-Party Parliamentary Group
BCC British Chambers of Commerce
BDF Business Disability Forum
BHA British Hospitality Association
CBI Confederation of British Industry
CIA Chemical Industry Association
CIPD Chartered Institute for Personnel and Development
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
EEF Engineering Employers' Federation
EO Employers Organisation
EU European Union
FSB Federation of Small Businesses
GLA Gangmasters Licensing Authority
HRM Human Resource Management 
HSE Health and Safety Executive
LWC Low Wage Commission
